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This paper develops an understanding toward a theory of asset
subscription. When a ﬁrm needs to raise cash from an asset that is
too large or too risky for a single individual or ﬁnancial institution
so that an auction method is not applicable, the ﬁrm may use a sub-
scription scheme. In this paper, we discuss a Nash subscription (NS)
scheme and a sequential subscription (SS) scheme. We characterize
the optimal strategy when the value of the asset is known. The com-
p a r i s o nb e t w e e naN Sa n daS Si sp r o v i d e d . T h ed i ﬀerence between
an auction scheme and a subscription scheme is discussed.
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When a ﬁrm needs to raise cash from an asset, it typically completes the task
in two ways. It can hire an investment bank which may take up or arrange
for a consortium of ﬁnancial institutions to take up and distribute the asset.
In this case, the price for the asset is set by the ﬁrm in consultation with
the investment bank. Or an auction-type of schemes can be used to sell the
asset. Between the two, the auction method, if applicable, often generates
higher value to the ﬁrm due to enhanced competition among potential buyers.
However, sometimes the asset that the ﬁrm would like to sell may be too large
or too risky for a single individual or ﬁnancial institution so that the auction
method is not applicable1. E x a m p l e so fs u c ha na s s e tc o u l db ea ne q u i t y
stake, a loan (performing or non-performing), a sovereign debt, a portfolio of
stocks that a government owned after a market intervention (e.g. Hong Kong
SAR). In this paper, we propose alternative schemes – subscription schemes
– to sell an asset and develop an understanding toward a subscription theory.
As will become clear later, a subscription scheme is like a value compe-
tition where value equals quantity times price. The price and quantity are
determined once all the subscribed values are ﬁn a l i z e d . T h i si si nc o n t r a s t
to auction scheme in which the price is typically called or submitted for a
given quantity. Also, in an auction scheme, there is typically a single winner
wherein in a subscription scheme all participants share a portion of the as-
set. Hence, through a subscription scheme, the ﬁr mc a ns e l la na s s e tw h i c h
1See Che and Gale (1998) for a study on standard auctions with ﬁnancially constrained
bidders.
2is too large for any single ﬁnancial institution to a group of interested bid-
ders. In a subscription scheme, by controlling the number of participants,
the ﬁrm can select the extent of the discount to make the asset attractive to
the participants.
An ultimate theory of asset subscription would require a study of optimal
strategy when the value of the asset is uncertain and/or when the partici-
pants value the asset diﬀerently. This paper serves to bring out only the
concept of asset subscription and will leave the more diﬃcult and interest-
ing problems of incorporating uncertainty as research topics for the future.
Appendix I contains a preliminary setup for conducting such an analysis
without attempting to solve for the optimal strategies. Another dimension
we neglected is the fact that bidders may have diﬀerent opportunity costs
for their funds. Instead, we assume that each bidder has access to only an
investment with a zero rate of return. So all bidders would like to make
maximum proﬁt from the asset subscription.
In section 2, we begin with a Nash subscription (NS) scheme with a
known value in which the optimal strategy is relatively easy to characterize.
In section 3, we characterize the optimal strategy in a sequential subscription
(SS) scheme. The optimal strategy is highly non-linear. Hence it is useful
to obtain some numerical examples. This is done in section 4. Section
5 contains discussions on the comparison between NS and SS and on the
diﬀerence between an auction scheme and a subscription scheme. Section 6
concludes.
32 Nash Subscription Scheme
There is a ﬁnancial asset with known value of unity, which needs to be sold to
N investors. In an NS, investor i submits a sealed bid, bi, that she is willing
to subscribe for a portion (yet to be determined) of the asset, i =1 , ...,N.









As mentioned in the introduction, we assume that each investor’s alter-






taking the values subscribed by other investors j 6= i as given (hence the
name Nash subscription). The ﬁrst order condition is
PN
j=1 bj − bi
hPN
j=1 bj
i2 − 1=0 .







4Thus, the recovery rate is Nb, which equals (N − 1)/N.T h e a s s e t i s t h u s
sold at a discount of 1/N. For example, for N =1 0 , it represents a 10%
discount.
3 Sequential Subscription
Sequential subscriptions are much harder to analyze. In an SS, the investors
are randomly ordered and the bids are submitted sequentially, hence the
name: sequential subscription. The following analysis is done by backward
induction.
Lemma 1 BN =
√
BN−1; dBN/dBN−1 =1 /(2BN).
Proof. Let BN−1 be the sum of values subscribed by investors i =




taking BN−1 as given. Alternatively, we can think of investor N as choosing




− [BN − BN−1],
taking BN−1 as given. The ﬁrst order condition is,














Obviously, BN = BN(BN−1)=... = BN(BN−1(...(Bi)...)) , Φ
−1
i (Bi) for




as a function of BN as in the lemma above for j =1 ,2,...N − 1, denoted by











But in general, what do we know about the functions Φj(BN)a n dΓj(BN)
for j =1 ,2,...N − 2?










− [Bi+1 − Bi].
The ﬁrst order condition is























Proof. Let B0 = 0. Then, for any i =0 ,1,...,N− 2,





Thus for i =0 ,1, 2,..., N − 2,
Bi+2 − Bi+1 =( Bi+1 − Bi)Γi+1(BN).
















BN − BN−1 =( BN−1 − BN−2)ΓN−1(BN)
=( BN−2 − BN−3)ΓN−2(BN)ΓN−1(BN)
= ...
=( Bi+1 − Bi)Γi+1(BN)...ΓN−2(BN)ΓN−1(BN),
7which can be substituted in the equation above to arrive at










By way of backward induction, we can ﬁnd the functional forms to all
Φj(BN)a n dΓj(BN) for j = N − 1,...1. The only task remaining is to ﬁnd
the condition that pins down BN. We have the following proposition:







BN − BN−1 =( BN−1 − BN−2)ΓN−1(BN)
=( BN−2 − BN−3)ΓN−2(BN)ΓN−1(BN)
= ...





The last step uses B1 = Φ1(BN)a n dB0 =0 .
84C o n c r e t e E x a m p l e s
4.1 The case of two investors































The bids are the same as in an NS scheme. This is a peculiar result because
we would have expected the bids to be diﬀerent under NS and SS, given the
result in duopoly theory that the quantities produced by the duopolies are
diﬀerent under the Nash-Cournot game and the Stackelberg game (see Boyer
and Moreaux, 1986 and Anderson and Engers, 1992).
94.2 The Case of Three Investors

























































3=.78868 (other solutions to
the equation will make some bs negative and are discarded). Note that this


































We will put the analysis for the cases of 4, 5 and 6 investors in Appendix
II. Here, let us construct a table, summarizing our ﬁndings on SS for a known
value of unity.
11Investors b B profit return share
1 0.250 0.250 0.250 1.000 0.500
2 0.250 0.500 0.250 1.000 0.500
Investors b B profit return share
1 0.359 0.359 0.096 0.268 0.455
2 0.263 0.622 0.070 0.268 0.333
3 0.167 0.789 0.045 0.268 0.211
Investors b B profit return share
1 0.412 0.412 0.042 0.101 0.454
2 0.261 0.674 0.026 0.101 0.287
3 0.151 0.825 0.015 0.101 0.167
4 0.083 0.908 0.008 0.101 0.092
Investors b B profit return share
1 0.442 0.442 0.019 0.043 0.461
2 0.258 0.701 0.011 0.043 0.269
3 0.142 0.843 0.006 0.043 0.149
4 0.076 0.919 0.003 0.043 0.079
5 0.040 0.959 0.002 0.043 0.041
Investors b B profit return share
1 0.461 0.461 0.009 0.020 0.470
2 0.256 0.717 0.005 0.020 0.261
3 0.137 0.854 0.003 0.020 0.140
4 0.072 0.925 0.001 0.020 0.073
5 0.037 0.962 0.001 0.020 0.038
6 0.019 0.981 0.000 0.020 0.019
Table 1: Sequential SubscriptionHere are some conclusions we can draw from the table:
• The discount required to sell the asset decreases rapidly as the number
of investors increases. When N =4 , the discount is already smaller
than 10 percent, the discount achieved in NS when N = 10.
• All investors obtain the same rate of return, which is decreasing as N
increases.
• There is a ﬁrst mover advantage: the investor who bids ﬁrst obtains
the highest share and proﬁt.
• For all investors, the proﬁt declines monotonically as N increases.
• The share of the ﬁrst investor is not monotonically decreasing as N
increases. It decreases when N goes from 2 to 3 and from 3 to 4, but
starts to increase as N goes from 4 to 5. This is because the share of
the ﬁrst investor is b1/B1; both the numerator and denominator are
increasing functions of N.
• We conjecture that when N approaches inﬁnity, the ﬁrst investor’s
subscription and share approach 1/2, the second investor’s approach
1/4, the third investor’s approach 1/8, etc. We call this “the bisection
conjecture.”2
2In Stackelberg oligopoly games, Boyer and Moreaux (1986) and Anderson and Engers
(1992) show that a linear demand curve induces a “law of bisection.” In a setting with
incomplete information studied by Zhang and Zhang (1999), they proved a variant of this
135 Discussions
5.1 NS and SS
So far, we have characterized the optimal strategies in a Nash subscription
and a sequential subscription. The optimal strategies in a sequential sub-
scription are given in a recursive fashion. We show that a small number of
investors are needed in an SS than in an NS to obtain a high recovery rate
for the seller of the asset. We also show that the ﬁrst mover has substantial
advantage in capturing a larger proﬁt. The limitation of the above analysis is
the assumption that the value of the asset is known and that the only alter-
native investment has a zero rate of return. The extension to the case with
uncertainty in the value of the asset is required for any potential real-world
applications.3 Some of the results may be overturned. For example, the ﬁrst







Our conjecture can be given an intuitive “proof”. First, BN → 1a sN →∞ . Second,
Γ0









T h e nL e m m a2a n dP r o p o s i t i o n4c a nb eu s e dt od e r i v e
b1 =1 /2,b 2 =1 /4,....
3In Appendix I, we show that even in a 2-investor SS game, the ﬁrst investor’s optimal
bidding strategy is not trivial.
14investor may not feel as secure as the last investor, because the ﬁrst does not
observe the private valuation of the last investor when making her decision
on the subscription.
When the value of the asset is known to all the investors, the investors
prefer to be in a Nash subscription scheme, which results in a deeper dis-
count. In auction theory, the result is stronger. It is known that in a more
general environment with uncertainty and private information, English auc-
tion (sequential bidding) generates higher expected revenue (recovery rate)
than other standard auctions, such as ﬁrst-price sealed-bid (simultaneous
bidding), since the former allows more information revelation. However, in
sequential subscription, the information pooling may be contaminated by
strategic underbids made by earlier investors to inﬂuence later investors who
use Bayesian updating. In any case, the sequential subscription scheme, al-
though fair ex ante, is unfair ex post in the sense that proﬁts for the investors
could be diﬀerent. This unfairness may be moderated if there are multiple
assets and investors are reordered after the sale of each asset.
Allowing for more realistic alternative investment opportunities will cer-
tainly complicate the characterization of optimal bidding strategies.
The following is a list of possible use of NS and SS:
• In the United States, the treasury bills are sold by “auction.” This
auction is diﬀerent from a traditional one in the sense that the bidders
bid both quantity and prices (the yields). Would an SS scheme be
easier to conduct and more transparent?
• Given the widespread use of Internet, it also seems possible that an
15IPO can be done by a sequential subscription scheme.
• The model of SS may have empirical relevance in a study of market
shares and rates of return for oligopolies. If an empirical pattern is
found which is compatible with the theory here or an extended version,
t h eo u t l i e r sm a yb ei d e n t i ﬁed as ﬁrms who have committed strategic
mistakes. This analysis of NS and SS suggests that when a country
opens its market in a particular industry (telecom, for example) to N
foreign investors, a sequential admission (SS) gives the country a better
deal than a simultaneous admission (NS).
• The SS scheme can also be used to run an experiment, testing whether
the second player can keep her promise in a two-player, one-shot game
when (1) the two players never either know or see each other (if the
game is played by phone or Internet), or (2) they do not know each
other before the game but have a face-to-face discussion of what they
will do. The ﬁrst player is the insider planted by the conductor of the
experiment.
5.2 Auction or Subscription
Auctions are typically used to sell items or projects to bidders who have
private valuations for these items. The main concerns are that an item goes
to the bidder who values it the most and a project is undertaken by the
bidder who is the most eﬃcient.
In the banking systems of many developing countries, there are problems
16of bad loans. In some cases, asset management companies are set up to
dispose of these bad loans. Because of the large risk involved, no single
ﬁnancial institution would be willing to take the assets, and hence an auction
method is diﬃcult to apply. When a subscription method is used, either a
Nash subscription or a sequential subscription, better risk sharing can be
achieved. Each institutional investor can participate in subscriptions for a
diversiﬁed set of bad loans.
In the literature of oligopoly, there were theories of quantity competition
(Nash-Cournot) and price competition (Bertrant). As we can see from the
above, a subscription scheme is like a value competition where value equals
quantity times price. The price and quantity are determined once all the
subscribed values are ﬁnalized. This is in contrast to auction scheme in
which the price is typically called or submitted for a given quantity.
Any auction mechanism is vulnerable to collusion. So is any subscription
scheme, whether NS or SS. In practice, one way to mitigate collusive behavior
is to use the following procedure that attaches a sealed-bid auction feature
to a sequential subscription scheme. First, information on the ﬁnancial asset
is released to potential institutional investors. Suppose that after a period
of inquiry, consultation and research, 20 investors showed interest to divide
up the asset. The 20 investors are invited to a room and they are randomly
grouped into 5 teams, each with 4 investors. The teams are then separated
into 5 closed rooms. For each team, a sequential subscription game is played
with a representative of the seller present. The winning team is the one that
pays the most for the asset, which is then distributed to the winning members
according to their subscription shares. This makes collusion more diﬃcult.
17Of course, the investors have to be given enough incentive to participate in
such a game in the ﬁrst place.
6C o n c l u s i o n
There are many choices as to how to sell an item: through organized mar-
kets, over the counter, auction schemes, rationing schemes, auction-rationing
schemes, lottery schemes, etc. In this paper, subscription schemes are pro-
posed as an alternative and the optimal strategies are studied in a simple
certainty framework. Ultimately, the subscription schemes will have to be
studied under uncertainty and the results compared with traditional auction
schemes (see a survey by Klemperer, 1999 on auctions) and auction-rationing
schemes (see Parlour and Rajan, 2001). The simple model shows that Nash
subscription and sequential subscription schemes allow a ﬁrm to sell an as-
set at a discount of its choice by picking the number of subscribers. We
anticipate that when this is extended to the case of uncertainty, the sequen-
tial subscription scheme would allow information revelation and risk sharing
among investors and hence will be a useful scheme.
18Appendix I
This appendix sets up a simple subscription game under uncertainty.
Suppose there is a loan with face value of unity with a recovery value, µ,
uniformly distributed in interval (0,1). Given, µ, investors receive imper-
fect signals s, uniformly distributed in [µ − µ(1 − µ),µ + µ(1 − µ)] ⊂ (0,1),
w h i c hh a sam e a ne q u a lt oµ and a variance equal to 2[µ(1 − µ)]
3 /3. The
intuition here is that if µ is close to 0 or 1, there is a smaller noise in the
signal. When µ is in the middle, the signals tend to be noisier.
In an N-investor NS game, each investor observes only her own signal.













In an N-investor SS game, the situation is much more complicated. Each
investor should infer what signals the bidders in front of her received. Let us
think about the simplest case of N = 2. We need to work backward.
Given b1 and the inferred ˜ s1 = f(b1), the best estimate of µ by investor
2i s
ˆ µ2 =
˜ s1 + s2
2
.


































Thus the ﬁrst investor’s problem becomes
max E
b1






where the expectation is taken with respect to s2, w h i c hi sc o n s i d e r e db y
investor 1 to be uniformly distributed in (s2
1,2s1 − s2
1)– namely, centered in
s1.
The ﬁrst order condition for investor 1 is
E





























Note that in the above notation, s2 is considered by investor 1 to be uniformly
distributed in (f(b1)2, 2f(b1) − f(b1)2). Therefore, we need to ﬁnd a function


















ds2 = 1 for any b1.
20This results in a diﬀerential equation in f with limb1→0f(b1)=0 . O n c e
we obtain f, the bidding function, b1 = f−1(s1), is easily available. It is
straightforward to check that the naive strategy mimicking the certainty
case, b1 = s1/4, namely f(b1)=4 b1 is not a solution (Jensen’s inequality is
at work).
21Appendix II
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5 − 9B5 +1
60B3
5 − 72B2
5 +2 1 B5 − 1
.
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6 +2 1 B6 − 1
360B4
6 − 600B3
6 +3 0 0 B2
6 − 45B6 +1
.
























6 +2 1 B6 − 1
360B4
6 − 600B3
6 +3 0 0 B2
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